This year marks the thirty year anniversary since the Piper Alpha Disaster. Like many I remember the incident vividly, and it is ultimately the catalyst for why I decided to pursue a Risk Control career. As well as being the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of financial loss, it is tragic, because of how preventable it was.
On the 8th July 1988 a condensate pump was taken out of service for maintenance by the day shift, the PSV (Pressure Safety Valve) of the pump was removed, and the blind was improperly installed. The night shift, not knowing this, restarted the pump which caused an uncontrolled release, and a large amount of condensate was released. As a result, this created an explosive vapour cloud. In parallel, the automatic fire fighting system had been put on manual mode due to diving operations.
At around 10pm the first explosion occurred, resulting in oil leaking from the separation module and main oil line to shore. At 10.20pm the second major explosion happened due to the rupture of one of the incoming pipeline risers, and at 10.50pm and 11.20pm the third and fourth explosions occurred as a result of the failure of the other two pipeline risers. Within a few hours only a few pieces of the steel structure above the sea surface remained, the only remnants left of the Piper Alpha platform, and 167 lives were lost, including two crewman of a rescue vessel.
The Cullen Inquiry was commissioned to find out how this disaster could have occurred, and in November 1990 released its report. It found that whilst safety policy and procedures were in place, they were not practiced. Furthermore there was a lack of proper training in emergency responses and a failure to conduct Risk Assessments.
There had been inadequate guidance or means to assess effectiveness of Safety Management System, and no formal shift hand-over from the Day Shift to the Night Shift, which combined with a failure of the Permit to Work System and other seemingly minor errors, had led to the disaster.
Multiple recommendations came out of the Cullen Report that remains valid today, including:
- Safety Case: Operators of fixed and mobile installations, should submit a formal safety assessment of hazards in design and operations. This needs to identify the potential major hazards and risks, associated with the operation.
- Auditing of Operator’s Management of Safety: The Operator is responsible for auditing compliance with their own Safety Management System (SMS) and the regulatory agency should routinely review and audit operators’ SMS audit program results.
- Safety Committee: Management, with leadership ensuring that the entire workforce is actively involved in day-to-day safety.
- Control of Process: New Control Rooms should be centralised, continuously manned with the Control Room operators who are trained and competent for their duties, including handling emergencies.
- Evacuation and Escape: Emergency Command should be in place, and escape routes should be planned and illuminated, standardisation of lights and alarms in an emergency system.
- Training: Personnel who work offshore are required to attend Emergency Safety training, and drills and exercises covering all credible accident scenarios should be held.
These aspects of Risk Control, along with the general management of hazardous operations including Permit to Work, Incident Reporting, Hydrocarbon Inventory, Pipework layout, Modification Controls, Fire Detection and Emergency Shutdown need to be fit for propose and routinely audited by competent persons for ongoing safe operation.
Working in Risk Control for me is the best job in the world, and this involves the sharing of knowledge from historical incidents and working together to minimise the potential for another similar incident to Piper Alpha.
Stuart Kenyon, AVP Risk Control